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THE VALUE OF
 PUBLIC SECTOR ANNUAL REPORTS AND ANNUAL  REPORTING AWARDS AS 
A SIGNAL OF MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE  
Abstract 
Australian public sector reforms have emphasised the accoun ability of agencies for the 
performance of management. Despite considerable diversity in public sector organisations, 
annual reports have been promoted as an appropriate tool to discharge the accountability of  
all government agencies. However, there remains an absence of consistent empirical evidence 
as to the value of the annual report for reporting on management performance. Further, 
debates about the role of public sector annual reports often become intertwined with notions 
of the quality of reports. Prior research has investigated the incentives of agencies to enter 
annual reporting awards as a means of signalling the quality of management. However, the 
research ignores the possibility that the value of annual reports to discharge performance 
accountability and the value of entry into an annual reporting award may vary depending on 
the type of public sector agency and on the relationships between stakeholders. This study 
focuses on the Queensland public sector and the Queensland Annual Reporting Awrd 
(QARA) and uses a series of case studies to examine the value of the annual report as a 
means of discharging accountabilities. The results reveal a cross sectional variation in the 
perceived value of the annual report in discharging accountabilities. In some ca es it was 
thought that alternative forms of communication provided a more suitable means to discharge 
the accountability demands of stakeholders. Further, while annual reporting awards provide a 
mechanism to supply a credible signal of quality, it will only be used in those situations 
where the participants identify direct benefits of entry. 
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THE VALUE OF PUBLIC SECTOR ANNUAL REPORTS AND ANNUAL  
REPORTING AWARDS AS A SIGNAL OF MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE  
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION  
 
The Australian public sector has been under an intensive period of reform since the early 
1980s.  Managerialist and corporate management philosophies have been promoted. These 
philosophies, with their accompanying reforms have focused on the efficiency of agencies, 
cost savings, streamlining of operations and commercially driven imperatives. Government 
agencies once held accountable for compliance with spending mandates are now accountable 
for their performance (Davis et al, 1993; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Gray and Jenkins, 1993). 
This performance emphasis in management has lead to a debate about the appropriate means 
of discharging public accountability and along with this an increased awareness of the role of 
annual reporting in the accountability chain.    
 
While it is acknowledged that the annual report does not report on the total accountabilities of 
public sector agencies, it is statutorily required as the primary medium of accountability  for 
all public sector agencies despite their considerable diversity (JCPA, 1989; QFMS, 1994; 
PAEC, 1999; Likierman, 1992). Further, the importance of the annual report is assumed by 
most commentators. As Boyne and Law (1991, p179) argue, the annual report is "the only 
comprehensive statement of stewardship available to the public". Coy et al., (2001, p14) 
concur stating: 
The value of the annual report rests in the provision of a wide range of summarized, 
relevant information in a single document, which enable all stakeholders to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of [an entity's] objectives and performance in financial 
and non-financial terms. No other single source of such information is available to all 
stakeholders on a routine basis. 
 
However, empirical evidence for these claims about the value of the annual report in the 
public sector is not evident. While some facets of annual reporting have been empirically 
examined (for example who uses reports) empirical evidence on the role of annual reports as 
a mechanism for discharging public accountability in the broad range of public sector 
organisations has not been undertaken. 
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Moreover, debates about the role of annual reporting in the public sector often become 
intertwined with notions of the quality of the reports. Consequently, some argue that the 
value of annual reports as an accountability document is diminished because of the  
variability in quality (JCPA, 1989; PAEC, 1999; PAC, 1996).  Likierman (1992) 
acknowledges this when he identifies vicious circles arising from poor reporting, in so far as 
poor-quality reports themselves may cause a lack of stakeholder interest.  
 
In an effort to improve the quality of public sector annual reporting in both the 
Commonwealth, States and territories, regulations covering the content quality and timeliness 
of annual reporting have been developed and refined since the late 1990s (Milazzo, 2; 
PAC, 1996; PAEC, 1999).  Further, to encourage improvement in th  quality of reporting, 
organisations in Australia have organised annual report awards, believing that such awards 
provide incentives for improvements in quality through the publicity generated (PAEC, 1999; 
PAC, 1996).  However, there is a lack of consistent empirical evidence regarding the quality 
of annual reports.   
 
Those empirical studies which have attempted to address the quality of annual reports have 
been critical of their quality.  These studies have tended to use three commonly recognised 
proxies of quality: extent of disclosures (length and level of detail); auditing of the reports; 
and timeliness of reporting (Magann, 1983). Magann (1983), however, introduces a fourth 
measure, that of ‘evaluation by other credible external bodies’ which he argues en ompasses 
all three common proxies and has the added advantage of allowing an agency’s annual report 
to be compared to other reports of similar agencies by independent experts. An annual 
reporting award is one example of this measure. 
 
The promoters of annual reporting awards argue that entering an agency’s report in an annual 
reporting award clearly demonstrates commitment to high quality reporting (ARA, 1997).  
This link between high quality reporting and annual reporting awards has motivated public 
sector researchers to investigate the incentives for entry into these annual reporting awards.   
US public sector researchers have investigated the incentives for entering annual report 
awards to discharge accountability to stakeholders and/or to signal the quality of 
management.  Two studies investigate the incentives of municipalities to apply for a 
Certificate of Conformance  (Evans and Patton, 1983; Evans and Patton, 1987).  Evans and 
Patton (1983) develop monitoring and signalling propositions that predict that entry into an 
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award provides high quality management with a credible means of signalling that quality.  
They base their research on an assertion that the cost of entering the award for low quality 
managers would be prohibitive because of the extra time and effort needed to raise a low 
quality report to an acceptable standard.  Using their logic, it follows that non entry into an 
award provides a signal of low quality management.  The researchers ignore the possibility 
that the value of award entry as a signal may vary depending on the types of agency and on 
the type of stakeholders.  While their results support their propositions, Evans and Patton 
(1987) acknowledge that the absence of a theory of public sector accounting that 
accommodates the complex accountability relationships in the public sector limits their 
research.  In addition, their studies have the methodological limitation of only concentrating 
on one level of government. This restricts the generalisability of their findings to the differe t 
types of agencies within the public sector more broadly, as each different type of public 
sector agency has its own accountability structures.    
 
There are several reporting awards that are available to Australian public sector agencies.  
This provides an opportunity to extend the prior research into an Australian setting and to  
address the theoretical and methodological limitations of prior US research.  This research 
will focus on the Queensland public sector and the Queensland Annual Reporting Awrd 
(QARA). The research has two objectives. First,  a series of case studies of a cross section of 
Queensland public sector agencies will be conducted to ascertain whether the annual report is 
perceived by account preparers to be an important tool for the discharge of accountabilities. 
Second,  the proposition that entry into an annual reporting award provides a signal of the 
quality of management of an agency will be explored.  More specifically, the study will 
investigate whether the value of the annual report nd entry into annual reporting awards, 
varies depending on the type of relationship between the stakeholders. These questions will 
be explored within a theoretical framework that addresses the multiple accountability 
relationships in the different types of public sector agencies.  While we acknowledge the 
complexity of the accountability concept as explored in the literature (for a recent appraisal 
see Parker and Gould, 1999), and understand Sinclair’s (1995) caution that important 
dimensions of accountability may be sacrificed by developing such a framework, we do so 
not in an attempt to get an 'all-purpose' definition for accountability, but in order to provide a 
framework of analysis to address the issue of the value of the annual report as a mechanism 
of how accountability is delivered.  
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The  research will aid in the understanding of the accountability relationships between 
various stakeholders in the different types of public sector agencies.  The insights gained into 
the role of annual reports as a means of discharging accountabilities in the Queensland public 
sector, as well as the value of entry into the Queensland Annual Report Award (QARA), will 
contribute to the ongoing debate concerning the role of public sector annual reports. The 
results should be of interest to all public sector regulatory bodies and Parliamentary 
committees who have concern with the accountability of agencies in the public sector and the 
enhanced role that the annual reports play in the evolving Australian public sector.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the theoretical framework.  The 
method for the study and the results are then reported.  The paper concludes with its findings, 
areas for further research and limitations of the study. 
 
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Cheng (1992, p1) is critical of prior studies of public sector accounting because, she argues, 
they have failed to “focus on the unique aspects of the governmental institutional 
environment”.   She expands previous work by arguing that public sector accounting 
researchers need to consider socioeconomic factors; political factors; the internal bureaucracy 
influences; and the external demands of actors; in any models which analyse accounting 
disclosures and practices in the public sector.  Her c ncerns on this issue are supported by 
other public sector researchers in the UK (see for example, Hepworth and Vass, 1984) and in 
Australia (see for example Guthrie, 1994 and Parker and Guthrie, 1990).  In her later work 
(Cheng, 1994), she develops these ideas further, by presenting a diagrammatic representation 
of the potential list of internal and external actors who are influential in the US public sector, 
and thus have an influence on accounting disclosures and practices. She considers 
Legislators, Chief Executives, and Bureaucratic Agents to be the key internal players in her 
politico-economic model.  Her external actors include voters (taxpayers and clientele), 
interest groups and the media, creditors, accounting regulators, professional accounting 
associations, external auditors, and other governments. In addition to classifying the actors in 
terms of whether they are internal or external to the agency, the diagram outlines the links of 
influence between each of the actors.  While Cheng’s model doe  addr ss the complexity of 
the relationships between public sector actors, she fails to differentiate between the relative 
importance of the various links of influence.  In her model, all influences are treated of equal 
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importance.  A major advance would be made if the strength of those influences could be 
differentiated.    
 
That differentiation could be made by examining the accountability literature.  There is 
general agreement that public sector accountability is more complex than that which exists in 
the private sector (Parker and Gould, 1999; Mulgan, 1997; Sinclair, 1995). Some researchers 
have made attempts to identify different types of accountabilities, arguing there is a diversity 
in the accountability relationships which affects the type of information given (see for 
example, Glynn and Perkins, 1997; Sinclair, 1995; Stewart, 1984).  Other researchers have 
argued that new public management has meant a move from external accountabilities to 
internal accountabilities, and in particular a focus on the accoun ability to the customer as 
opposed to accountabilities to the Parliament and the public (see Parker and Gould, 1999).  
 
While the boundaries of accountability are debated, so is its meaning.  Accountability only 
exists where there is a relationship f authority such as exists between a principal and agent; a 
person who is supervised and the supervisor, a representative and those represented; an 
accountor and the accountee, and the subordinate and the superior (Mulgan, 1997; Stewart, 
1994). The relationship does not exist between persons of equal status (Mulgan, 1997).  
Mulgan (1997) argues that there are 4 processes or stages in the overall process of 
accountability.  Only one of these, the reporting function is laid on the accountor, ie. the one 
who is held to be accountable.  The other three processes; information seeking, assessment or 
verification, and direction or control are rights belonging to the accountee, ie the one to 
whom the account is owed.  The crux of the accountability relationship is the ability of the 
accountee to assess and improve the quality of performance and have the power to make 
evaluations based on that report (Stewart, 1984;  Hoskin, 1996).  It  is the element of power 
to evaluate, and capacity to exercise this power which is the true essence of accountability.  
To clarify this, Stewart (1984),  distinguishes between two elements of accountability; that of 
a “bond of accountability” and a “link of accountability”.  He argues that the bond of 
accountability is a recognition of responsibility of one party to another, whereas the links of 
accountability are a recognition of a mutual expectation of responsiveness often developed 
over time as a matter of custom. Thus, it is the bond of accountability, the being able to hold 
to account that is crucial. The element of power, which is essential to the bond of 
accountability, he argues is not present in those relationships that have a link of account.  
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The distinction between bonds of accountability and links of accountability and the fact that 
public accountability derives primarily from ownership and legal authorisation (Mulgan, 
1997), provides the opportunity to differentiate the relative importance of the links of 
influence in Cheng’s model.  In addition, this differentiation and its application to the various 
internal and external stakeholders will be developed in accordance with the various 
institutional arrangements within the Australian public sector.   
 
Two different frameworks are developed of the “Chain of Accountabilities”.  Although the 
system of accountabilities are broadly similar in each, the context and stakeholders will 
change, and this can have important consequences for the operation of accountabilities. The 
first is applicable to three types of agencies in the Australian public sector; government 
departments, statutory bodies (SBs) and government owned corporations (GOCs), which 
operate within a Parliamentary system of government. A second framework is developed for 
local governments which work to another level of government.  Both diagrams indicate the 
multiplicity of stakeholders for public sector agencies, a theme which is acknowledged in 
prior literature (see for example, Parker and Gould, 1999; Burritt and Welch, 1997; Sinclair, 
1995). 
 
From Figure 1 it can be seen that in the case of government departments, SBs and GOCs, 
bonds of accountability can be identified between the internal stakeholders: the CEO; the 
Board of Directors (in the case of some SBs and GOCs), the relevant Minister and 
Parliament; internal creditors (other public sector agencies),and the Auditor-General.  Links 
of accountability can be identified between the other internal stakeholders being Treasury and 
other regulatory bodies. Further bonds of accountability can be identified between the main 
external stakeholders: taxpayers/levypayers/shareholders; and external creditors 
(suppliers/lenders).  All other external relationships have links of accountability. 
 
Figure 1 Chain of Accountabilities for Departments, Statutory bodies, GOCs  
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The relationship for external stakeholders in the local government framework seems similar 
to that depicted in Figure 1. However, this is not the case for internal stakeholders.  There are 
fewer bonds of accountability between the internal stak holders.  Most notably the bond ends 
with the elected officials (ie. the Councillors).  In the case of local government councils, the 
main internal stakeholders with bonds of accountability are the CEO, the elected councillors, 
and internal creditors. These stakeholders and their relationships are depicted in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Chain of Accountabilities for Local Government Councils 
 
Tax/levypayers/
shareholders
Parliament
(politicians)
Minister
(politician)
CEO
(bureaucrat)
Executives
(bureaucrats)
Interest
Groups2
Auditor- General
Treasury/
other reg
bodies
Media
Board of
Directors1
Creditors
(suppliers/lenders)
INTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS
EXTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS
Key: Bonds of accountability
Links of
accountability
Internal  creditors
1 For GOCs and some statutory bodies
2 Includes competitors/ customers/ clients/other equivalent
   public sector agencies
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As stated in the introduction to this study, one aim of the development of this theoretical 
framework was to aid in the understanding of the value of the annual report as the main 
accountability document for discharging obligations between the stakeholders.  From Figure 
1 and Figure 2 it can be seen that there are variations in the types of stak hold rs and in the 
relationships between them.  Specifically, bonds of accountability have been differentiated 
from links of accountability.  Based on the premise that a bond of accountability arises 
through their being a power to hold to account, it is contended that the annual report has 
increased importance in these instances.  In the instances where a link of accountability 
exists, which is merely an expectation of responsiveness, other means of communications, 
such as brochures, and advertisemen s may be adequate to satisfy stakeholders demands.  In 
fact, it is possible that less formal details specifically targeted at the needs of these 
stakeholders would be more useful. This contention motivates Research Question 1.  
 
Auditor- General
Ratepayers/voters
Parliament/
Committees(politicians)
CEO
(bureaucrat)
Executives
(bureaucrats)
Interest
Groups1
Media
Creditors
(suppliers/lenders)
INTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS
EXTERNAL
STAKEHOLDERS
Dept Local
Government &
Planning
(bureaucrats)
Elected Officials
(politicians)
Key: Bonds of accountability
Links of accountability
Internal creditors
1 Includes competitors/ customers/ clients/other equivalent
   public sector agencies
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Research question 1 
Is it considered that the value of the annual report as a tool in discharging accountability 
obligations varies depending on the type of relationship between the stakeholders? 
 
The framework also provides a useful framework for the analysis of the value of entry into 
the QARA as a signal of the quality of management.  It is reasonable to expect that public 
sector agencies may wish to signal the quality of their reporting and of management.  Similar 
to the motivation for research question 1, it is contended that the value of a signal of the 
quality of management will vary depending on the level of accountability between the 
stakeholders.  Moreover, in the absence of the market as a means of supplying information 
about the quality of an agency, this raises the potential, that alternative signals of 
management performance assume even greater importance. An investigation of research 
question 2 will address this issue. 
 
Research question 2 
Is it considered that the value of entry into the QARA as a signal of the quality of 
management varies depending on the type of relationship between the stakeholders? 
 
The next section provides an outline of the method adopted to address these 2 research 
questions. 
 
3.0 METHOD 
 
The Queensland Annual Reporting Awards (QARA) provides the point of focus for this 
study.  The stated aim for instigating the QARA was to improve the quality of public sector 
reporting (QARA, 1997).  The number of entries since the inception of the award in 1981 has 
steadily increased.  In 1981 there were only 16 entries as compared to a total of 50 entries in 
1996.  Table 1 summarises the 1996 (the year of focus for this study) entries by type of 
agency. 
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Table 1 Analysis of QARA Participation by Type of Agency 
Type of Agency Number of Entries Total Number of 
Agencies 
Rate of 
Participation 
Government Departments 15 25a 60% 
Statutory Bodies 20 201a 10% 
Government Owned Corporations 
 
9 21 a 43% 
Local Government 6 150b 4% 
Total  50 397 13% 
a QAO, 1996 
b ABS, 1997 
 
Despite the increased participation in the awards it can be seen that only 13% of the total 
eligible entrants chose to enter.  When analysed on the basis of type of agency it is evident 
that the rate of participation varies considerably.  A high proportion of departments, 60%, 
chose to enter the award in 1996.  The second most highly participating type of agency was 
the GOCs where 43% of total possible GOCs chose to enter.  This contrasts sharply with the 
participation rate for SBs and local governments that were much lower, 10% and 4% 
respectively.  The implications of the different rates of participation will be considered 
further in the results section.  
 
The data source for this study is a series of case studies of Queensland public sector agencies 
across the four types of agencies; government departments, SBs, GOCs and local 
governments. The selection of the subjects for the case studies was made on a number of 
criteria.  The first criteria was that the agencies must have been identified as material by the 
Queensland Audit Commission (FitzGerald, 1996) or the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS, 1997). Second, all agencies selected must have been Brisbane based to enable 
sufficient accessibility for the researchers.  Third, the agencies were selected by choosing at 
least one “QARA enterer in 1996” and one “QARA non-e terer in 1996”, from each state 
government agency type (departments, SBs, and GOCs); and from local government 
councils.  Fourth, all of the selected agencies must have entered the QARA in at least one 
prior year.  This criteria was included to ensure a depth of understanding regarding the 
benefits and costs of QARA entry. Enterers had decided that entry was beneficial whereas 
non-enterers who had previously entered had made a deliberate decision to not enter and had 
therefore decided that the net value of their entry would be negative having already 
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experienced the outcomes from entry.  One extra SB that was a QARA enterer was included 
in an attempt to obtain a broader coverage of the sector, which is diverse in terms of revenue 
source, and degree of commercialisation. The three agencies chosen were the Queensland 
Building Services Authority which receives income primarily from industry levies; the 
Queensland Tourist and Travel Corporation which was partially budget-funded 
(approximately 40%); and Queensland Treasury Corporation which receives income 
primarily from investments.  It was expected that selecting agencies with different revenue 
sources, would result in information regarding whether revenue source type provides 
different benefits to entering the QARA. 
 
All agencies that were selected readily agreed to take part in the study. This high level of 
interest supports the contention of Davis et al (1992) that public sector agencies are very 
interested in issues concerning accountability and annual reporting. The agencies chosen as 
case study subjects are identified in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Public Sector Agencies Selected for Interview 
Agency Type 1996 QARA Entry 1996 QARA Non-entry 
Departments Transport Department Education Department 
SBs  Qld Building Services Authority 
Qld Tourist & Travel Corporation 
Qld Treasury Corporation 
GOCs Qld Industry Development Corporation Qld Investments Corporation 
Local Government 
Councils 
Pine Rivers Shire Logan City 
 
 
The primary source of data for this study was obtained through semi-structured interviews 
with a nominee from each agency. Semi-structured interviews were employed in an attempt 
to allow the researchers to direct the conversation while providing the respondent with every 
opportunity to freely express their views. King (1994) claims that to gain access into the 
underlying perceptions of the respondent it is imperative to strike a balance between the need 
to structure an interview with the need to provide the respondent with optimal opportunity to 
express their views without restriction through an abundance of open-ended questions.  This 
need to unearth the underlying perceptions of respondents rendered less personal approaches 
such as mail questionnaire unsuitable.   
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All interviews were conducted in person on the premises of the agency.  The interviewees 
have not been identified for confidentiality reasons, however, all agencies provided 
permission to be identified. To ensure transcription accuracy, all interviews were taped (with 
the interviewee’s permission) and transcribed in full.  Interview time ranged from thirty 
minutes to seventy minutes, with an average time of forty minutes.  The results of the 
interviews pertaining to the two research questions are outlined in the next section. 
 
4.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Research question 1 
Is it considered that the value of the annual report as a tool in discharging accountability 
obligations varies depending on the type of relationship between the stakeholders? 
 
The interviewees from all agencies agr ed, in principle, that the annual report provided a 
valuable mechanism to discharge accountabilities.  However, the usefulness of the annual 
report was perceived to vary for different stakeholders for the various types of agencies.  
 
The interviewees from the government departments, SBs and GOCs perceived that the annual 
report was an important accountability tool for their internal stakeholders.  From Figure 1 it 
can be seen that these agencies have a long chain of accountability with numerous internal
stakeholders having the power to hold agencies accountable for their performance.  In these 
circumstances the use of an annual report provides a formal, and more complete document 
which reports on all aspects of an agency’s performance.  These results are consistent with 
the normative research (see for example, PAEC, 1999), which holds that Parliament is the 
primary target audience for annual reports. These results are also consistent with New 
Zealand research by Hay (1994) who concluded that in the case of tertiary institutions, 
internal stakeholders were the main users of annual reports.   
 
In the case of local government, representatives agreed that the annual report was a valuable 
accountability tool for internal users, however, they perceived that supplement ry methods of 
communication were necessary.  The interviewees saw councillors as the main internal 
stakeholder to which local governments are accountable and felt that they were able to tailor 
specific information to meet their needs. The interviewees therefore thought that the 
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supplementation of the information within the annual report with other more specific 
information was a cost effective means of discharging accountabilities. 
 
In the case of the external stakeholders, all interviewees agreed that the annual report was a 
necessary accountability tool for external creditors. However, they did not agree that the 
annual report was a suitable tool for the discharge of bonds of accountability to all external 
stakeholders.  GOCs and those SBs which are externally funded also agreed that the annual 
report was the main accountability document given to their fundproviders (shareholders and 
levyholders).  This contrasts with government departments, budget funded SBs and local 
governments who did not see the annual report as the appropriate accountability document 
for their fundproviders (taxpayers and ratepayers).  While accountability remains paramount 
for these groups, other means of communication through informal publications, brochures 
and media releases were thought to be more appropriate.  This result supports the research of 
Kloot & xxx, (forthcoming), which showed that for local government ratepayers, news 
articles, radio segments, and community consultations are used to demonstrate accountability 
to ratepayers and the wider community. 
 
An explanation for this result lies in the diverse nature of fund providers to public sector 
agencies.  In the case of government departments and budget funded SBs, the primary fund 
providers are taxpayers, while ratepayers are the primary fund providers for local 
governments.  Taxpayers and ratepayers constitute a diverse group of ordinary citizens whose 
concerns are likely to be different to the shareholders and levyholders of GOCs and 
externally funded SBs.  Thus it would appear that in those agencies where the external 
stakeholders are a diverse group (taxpayers and ratepayers) and where the agencies are 
dependent on these stakeholders for the provision of funds, the annual report is replaced by 
more specific accountability devices.   This is consistent with the research by Sinclair (1995), 
which argued that alternative mechanisms to demonstrate accountability such as newspaper 
reports, other media channels and public hearings were used.  In contrast, and consistent wi h 
private sector research (see for example, Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986), agencies which 
obtain funds from a small and well defined group (levy funded statutory bodies and GOCs) 
use the annual report as an accountability tool for communication.  One explanation for these 
results across the different agencies, is that the annual report contains the basic audited 
statutory financial information, but limited performance information (FitzGerald et al, 1996).  
Indeed, in some cases, the financial informatio  comprises around 50% of the annual report.  
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If the primary emphasis of an agency is on service provision and not on primary financial 
information (as in the case of government departments, budget funded statutory bodies and 
local governments), then a small, ore concise, specifically written document which 
highlights service achievements is more likely to be a more effective communication device 
in discharging accountabilities.  Indeed, the results of this study bear out this position. 
 
In summary, this research has confirmed the value of the annual report as a tool in 
discharging accountability obligations.  In addition, the value of that annual report was found  
to vary depending on the type of relationship between the stakeholders.  In some 
circumstances alternative means of communication were thought to provide a more 
appropriate means of discharging accountability.  The next section will apply the same 
framework and the insights gained from research question 1 to address the second research 
question. 
 
Research Question 2 
Is it considered that the value of entry into the QARA as a signal of the quality of 
management varies depending on the type of relationship between the stakeholders? 
 
The most cited benefit of receiving an annual reporting award was the positive publicity 
created. All interviewees agreed that the major benefit of entry into the QARA was that it 
provided an opportunity to gain external validation of the quality of reporting.  They also all 
agreed that the external validation provided by the receipt of a QARA was regarded as an 
independent (credible) signal of the overall quality of management to the stakeholders. This 
result provides external validation of prior US studies which identify that the major benefit of 
value of entry into annul reporting awards is that it provides a credible signal of both the 
quality of financial reporting and the quality of management.   
 
While all interviewees agreed that the receipt of an award was a powerful signal of the 
quality of management, the decision to enter was not always cost effective.  This is borne out 
by the low participation rate reported in Table 1. The interviewees cited both direct and 
indirect costs of entry. The direct costs of entry are low, being an entry fee of $100, and were 
not thought to be an important factor in the decision of whether to enter. The indirect costs 
were considered to be greater in magnitude and included both the cost of improving the 
annual report to a standard suitable for entry, and the cost of being exposed as a low quality 
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reporter should the entry be unsuccessful.  These indirect costs would be higher for those 
agencies that produce low quality reports. This fact provides the basis for the signalling 
model provided by Evans and Patton (1987).  They argue that entry in o an award is a 
credible signal of high quality management because the indirect costs incurred by poor 
managers would make entry prohibitive.  That is, poor quality managers are expected to have 
lower quality reports, and therefore the indirect costs of getting their reports to a standard 
suitable for entry would be very high.  Whereas high quality managers are already expected 
to generate reports of sufficient quality to enable entry without incurring further costs. 
 
A literal interpretation of the Evans and Patton (1987) model would mean that all high quality 
managers will have high quality reports and would therefore be expected to enter annual 
reporting awards because the direct costs of entry are immaterial. It could therefore be 
concluded that the low participation rate identified in Table 1 provides evidence that the 
quality of reporting and hence management of Queensland public sector agencies is low. 
However, such a conclusion is based on the assumption that costs drive the decision to enter 
and that the benefits that accrue from signalling the quality of management through entry are 
constant.  If instead the benefits vary across agencies as shown in research question 1, and the 
decision is driven by consideration of both the costs and benefits then th  low rate of 
participation may be explained if the net benefits for some agencies are too low to warrant 
entry.  
 
The comments of the interviewees support the contention that the decision to enter depends 
on a cost/benefit analysis. The interviewe s who were 1996 enterers all agreed that benefits 
of entering QARA exceeded the costs in that year.  The non-enter rs contended that the 
excessive costs of entry were not justified given the benefits that were to be obtained. They 
either argued that the quality of reporting required by QARA was excessive or that they had a 
better means of obtaining external validation for their performance.  In support of this 
position, one interviewee stated that: 
 
the costs of producing QARA reports is far higher than tat t is adequate for 
accountability. 
 
A further interviewee stated: 
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we have another means of reflecting quality management through the achievement of 
a AAA rating rather than reliance on quality reporting.
 
The findings for research question 1 confirmed that the annual report was perceived as a 
valuable tool for the discharge of accountability, where a bond of accountability existed 
between the stakeholders.  It was argued that for government departments, SBs and GOCs, 
there was a longer chain of accountability with numerous internal stakeholders having the 
power to hold agencies to account and that it was in these circumstances that the annual 
report was a valuable tool to discharge accountability.  Where the annual report is considered 
to be the primary tool for discharging accountability it would be expected that the receipt of 
an award would provide external validation of the quality of reporting and hence the quality 
of management. This raises the expectation that these types of agencies have the most to gain 
from entering an annual reporting reward. Table 1 partially supports this position with 
government departments and GOCs having the highest rates of participation in QARA. 
However, the rate of participation for SBs is significantly lower at 10%. While his low level 
of participation seemingly contradicts the expectations it should be noted that this group is 
highly diverse in terms of revenue and functions. In fact of the 201 SBs, only 34 are material 
trading, or financial enterprises or universities as identified by FitzGerald et al (1996), with 
most of the rest being comprised of very small agencies such as area water and drainage 
boards. The appropriate participation rate for this group if only material agencies are 
considered is therefore closer t  59%.  
 
ln instances where the accountability focus is placed on alternative means of communication, 
the external validation of the quality of reporting in the annual report could be expected to be 
a less effective means of signalling the quality of management.  For local governments it was 
argued that the annual report was not the key tool in discharging accountability, and that 
alternative means of communication are more appropriate.  Following the logic used above a 
QARA award would be a less valuable signal of the quality of management for local 
governments than for the other 3 types of agencies. This is supported by the data in Table 1 
from which it can be seen local governments had the lowest participation rate of the four 
types of agencies.  
 
The interviewees also identified benefits of QARA entry that were not directly associated 
with signalling the quality of management.  Some of these did accrue to the agency. For 
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example, employee motivation, promotion of the agency within the public sector, 
benchmarking of results and targeting of clients and prospective clients for business 
generation were identified as benefits. Other benefits mentioned were personal benefits for 
individuals rather than the agency as a whole. These benefits were thought to accrue t  the 
CEO, the preparer of the accounts, or the relevant Minister and included self promotion in the 
external and internal market for executive/political positions, and improved remuneration 
packages. The importance of the value of the signal for personal gain by these individuals 
was emphasised particularly by the interviewees from government departments and GOCs. A 
possible explanation for this emphasis is that executives within these agencies are more 
mobile within their sectors and therefore they are able to influence their transferability with 
this signal.  This position is confirmed by one interviewee who stated: 
 
The CEO is the driving force in entering the award in our agency.  It makes him look 
good in the Minister’s eyes and improves his chances for  promotion. 
 
Interviewees who were non-e terers were the most critical of entry being driven by personal 
benefits.  They felt that the incurring of organisational costs for the benefit of individuals 
within the agency was bordering on an unethicalpractice.  In fact, one interviewee claimed 
that: 
 
Ambitious supervisors placed excessive performance demands on employees to 
ensure that the reports were of high enough quality to win an award to enhance their 
reputation. 
 
In summary, while entry into the QARA was seen to be a credible signal of the quality of 
management, the direct and indirect costs of entry provide disincentives to enter the award.  
In addition, the benefits associated with QARA entry were found to vary depending on the 
type of relationship between the stakeholders.  For agencies that relied on the alternative 
forms of communication to discharge accountability, the gaining of external validation of the 
content of the annual report was thought to be less valuable.  One caveat to the value of the 
annual reporting award is that the findings suggest that managers are able to capture personal 
benefits through entry.  This may be problematic for an agency if the benefits accrue mainly 
to the individual while the agency bears the costs. 
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
In Australia, despite the considerable diversity in public sector entities, public sector annual 
reports have been promoted as a key mechanism to discharge accountabilities to stakeholders.  
It has been assumed that the annual report is valuable in discharging accountabilities for all 
stakeholders in each of the different types of public sector agencies. This contention though, 
has not been examined empirically.  Further, the value of the public sector annual report is 
intertwined with notions of their quality. Prior US empirical research has focused on entry 
into annual reporting awards as a means to gain external validation of annual reporting 
quality and hence perceptions of the quality of management.  However, the results of prior 
research have not considered the impact of the relationships between the various stakeholders 
and differences between stakeholders in different types of public sector entities 
 
This study attempted to redress limitations of prior research by developing a framework of 
the chain of accountabilities that exist within the different types of public sector agencies in 
Australia. This framework provided a synthesis of the work of Cheng (1992, 1994) and 
Stewart (1984) and adapted it to the Australian context to make explicit the nature of the 
accountabilities that exist between the various stakeholders.  This enabled the distinction to 
be made between bonds of accountability (responsibility) and links of accountability 
(responsiveness) for both internal and external stakeholders. Aft r consideration of the 4 
different types of agencies in Australia, two frameworks were developed.  The first pertained 
to government departments, SBs and GOCs, where a long and complex chain of 
accountability exists; the second pertained to local governments  where the chain of 
accountability was much shorter.  Two research questions were developed. The first question 
concerned the value of annual reports as a tool to discharge accountabilities to stakeholders; 
the second question concerned the value of entry into annual reporting awards as a credible 
signal of the quality of management. 
 
In relation to Research Question 1, respondents from all areas agreed in principl that the 
annual report provided a valuable mechanism to discharge accountabilities.  H wever, the 
usefulness of the annual report varied depending on the type of agency and the different 
stakeholders.  In relation to internal stakeholders, while the annual report was used by 
departments, GOCs and statutory bodies, local government respondents preferred the use of 
more informal, ‘brochure-typ ’ documents, media releases, and personal contact with 
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councillors, over a formal annual report. This finding is consistent with the differences 
identified in the theoretical frameworks for these agenci .  For external creditors, all 
agencies agreed that the annual report was used as an accountability device. GOCs and SBs 
which were externally funded also used the annual report to discharge accountability 
obligations. The exception was for government departments, budget-funded SBs and local 
governments, where the fund providers were a diverse group, the annual report was replaced 
by other means of communication such as informal publications, brochures and media 
releases. The findings for question 1 suggest that government departments, SBs and GOCs 
value the annual report as a means of discharging accountability more than local 
governments.  Following the theoretical framework developed in this study, it would be 
expected that the value of entering QARA would be greatest for those agencies which use the 
annual report to signal the quality of annual reporting and hence quality of management.  The 
entry statistics for the 1996 QARA are consistent with this finding with government 
departments, SBs and GOCs having the highest rates of participation. Local governments 
were least likely to enter.  
 
In relation to Research Question 2 all respondents agreed that the major benefit of entry into 
the QARA was that it provided external validation of the quality of reporting and that this 
was regarded as an independent signal of the overall quality of management to stakeholders.  
However, the interviewees also agreed that the decision to enter was not always cost 
effective.  They cited both direct and indirect costs of entry that represented a deterrent to 
enter.  In addition, some interviewees argued that the quality of reporting required by QARA 
was excessive, or that they had a better means of obtaining external validation of 
management performance.  
 
The study has some limitations.  The first occurs as a result of the restrictions on the scope of 
the study.  By focussing on an annual reporting award in one jurisdiction in one year only 
(1996), it is possible that the data is unique to that jurisdiction in that particular ye r.  In 
addition, the representative faithfulness of the perceptions of the research subjects is limited 
due to the very small and potentially biased sample. All interviewees were middle managers, 
and a different perspective may have been gained by interviewing Chief Executive Officers.  
These would be overcome by extending the study to other years in different jurisdictions and 
by using a larger data set.   
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The implications of the study are interesting.  The research identified cross sectional variation 
in the perceived  value of annual reports to discharge accountability depending on the 
relationship between stakeholders. For some stakeholders alternative means of 
communication were thought to be more appropriate. This finding should be of interest to 
regulators who have emphasised the promotion of the quality of reporting in the annual 
report. The findings of this study suggest that these policy makers might also need to address 
the content of the informal communications that are being used to discharge accountabilities 
for many stakeholders of the agencies. Indeed, for those agencies that place low emphasis on 
the annual report perhaps a short form annual report would be more suitable. This would 
mirror the recent moves in the Australian private sector wher  the provision of a full annual 
report to shareholders is no longer mandatory. 
 
The findings also have implications for the promoters of annual reporting awards.  The 
seemingly low participation rates could be posited as an indicator that the quali y of reporting 
is low.  However, the findings of this study indicate that even high quality reporters will not 
enter unless they can identify direct benefits from entry. Therefore, while entry may be 
perceived to supply a credible signal of management quality, the alternative conclusion 
cannot be drawn from non-e try.  That is, there is no unilateral criteria for the measurement 
of the quality of management based on award entry.  In addition, our results imply that 
QARA does provide a service by enabling high quality managers to signal that quality in 
situations where they deem appropriate.  One caveat to this conclusion is that it was thought 
that in some circumstances that QARA entry was a means for individuals to capture private 
benefits at the expense of their agency that bore the costs of entry. 
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